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I. THE DILEMMAS OF GRAND THEORY
I suppose that we could treat the recent appearance of works by
Professors Ely' and Choper as an example of the happy phenomenon, widely
noted in the history of science,3 of the simultaneous discovery,4 and then go
on to discuss the merits of their discovery. But that would obscure some quite
interesting aspects of their work. First, their analyses are not, strictly speak-
ing, discoveries, but rather are rediscoveries. John Marshall justified judicial
review by referring to inadequacies in the political process in McCulloch v.
6Maryland,5 as Professor Ely notes, and justified restrictions on review when
the political process was adequate in Gibbons v. Ogden.7 A century later
Harlan Stone made the same points, not only in the Carolene Products foot-
note so important to Professor Ely,8 but also in South Carolina State Highway
Department v. Barnwell Brothers9 and in dissent in United States v. Butler.'o
That is enough to show that we are not dealing with the rediscovery of some-
thing propounded first by an obscure Bohemian monk," and to suggest that
the intellectual historian may have as much to say about the Ely-Choper
approach as the constitutional scholar does. Second, Professors Ely and
Choper are only two members in a general revival of "Grand Theory" in
constitutional law, in which Professors Tribe 2 and Perry, 13 among others,
also take part. The last Grand Theorizing era can be dated from Herbert
Wechsler's Holmes Lectures 4 and Alexander Bickel's early work, 5 but that
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. B.A., 1967, Harvard University. J.D., M.A., 1971, Yale
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I. J. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) [hereinafter cited as ELY].
2. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) [hereinafter cited as
CHOPER].
3. See R. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 352-70 (1973).
4. Other contributors to this Symposium make the similarities between the works clear. Both justify
judicial review by the existence of obstacles to the vindication of individual choice in the normal political
process. Professor Choper does not formally extend this theory to the area of individual rights as Professor Ely
does, but it is hard to see how, for example, a rights-based approach to that area could readily be joined with the
functional theory Professor Choper invokes in the area of governmental structure.
5. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
6. ELY. supra note I. at 85-86.
7. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
8. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), discussed in ELY, supra note 1, at
75-77.
9. 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938).
10. 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1935)(Stone, J., dissenting).
II. R. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 352-70 (1973).
12. L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978 & Supp. 1979).
13. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantiie Due
Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976).
14. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
15. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
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epoch ended some time in the early 1960s, after which constitutional scholar-
ship tended simply to work out some of the implications of the "neutral
principles" theory. The intellectual historian should wonder why Grand
Theory has become attractive again.
One feature of intellectual history is that it takes ideas seriously. So the
intellectual historian would also note the strong prima facie case that can be
made for the Marshall-Stone-Ely-Choper approach, and would ask why its
acceptance has ebbed and flowed so dramatically. The prima facie case draws
its power from the fundamental assumptions of liberal political theory, which
have gone essentially unchallenged in the dominant institutions of this
country since the framing of the Constitution. In brief, those assumptions lead
to the conclusion that social decisions ought to result from the aggregation of
individual choice in a world where interests, however defined, conflict. 6 Just
as the market aggregates choice through consumer decision, so politics
aggregates citizen choice through voting. And just as the market operates by
asking consumers what they want, so politics operates by asking citizens what
they want. But we know that we can identify market failures that call for
political regulation. The political obstacles approach of Marshall et al. seeks
to identify failures in the political process which call for constitutional regula-
tion. Once the obstacles are removed, voter sovereignty, like consumer
sovereignty, will produce the best aggregation of individual choice.
There are, of course, some difficulties with the market analogy. For
example, the model of consumer sovereignty can function only after an initial
distribution of voting-wealth. Perhaps we could live with "one person, at least
one vote" by analogy to the possession by each consumer of some minimum
dollar-wealth in the market model, but I suspect that the move to the stronger
"one person, no more than one vote" rule will be hard to justify.'7 Of course,
we could join voting-wealth to dollar-wealth, and use as our initial position
"one person, no more than one vote" plus unrestricted power to invest in
political activity. That rule would make Buckley v. Valeo'S the necessary
supplement to the reapportionment decisions, and has the additional advan-
tage of alleviating recurrent problems of measuring intensity in politics'9 by
inserting the market measure of intensity, the willingness to spend, into the
political market. But it might well destabilize the initial allocation of political
wealth.20 Similar problems attend the identification of political obstacles. For
example, one wants to treat the first amendment as justified by the need to
maintain unrestricted access by political consumers to policies they might
choose, but then one has to worry about the analogy to the regulation of false
16. See generally R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
17. See ELY, supra note 1, at 120-24. See also Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contribu-
tions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1048-51 (1980).
18. 424 U.S. I (1976).
19. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 90-119 (1956).
20. See C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977).
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or misleading advertising. These difficulties, however, need not be eliminated
for the intellectual historian's effort to make sense. I have claimed only that a
powerful prima facie case can be made that the political obstacles approach is
the best means of aggregating individual choice. The case cannot be defeated
simply by identifying problems internal to that approach, unless additional
requirements are inserted. The critic must show that alternative means of
aggregation are better.
This point should make clear that even theories of the Constitution
premised on rights have to confront the prima facie case for voting. Those
theories take many forms: reflective equilibrium in front of the veil of ignor-
ance, the considered judgment of the society over time, even Professor
Tribe's pigeon-pecking principle.2' Rights theories are theories of aggregation
too;22 they just have a larger time frame or are concerned with more subtle
political obstacles than the basic version. The difficulty that the prima facie
case poses for rights theories is precisely the comparative institutional
problem I have mentioned. All institutions will aggregate choice imperfectly;
the question for rights theories is whether the political process, purified by
applying the basic political obstacles approach, would misidentify rights more
frequently than the judicial process would.
Here I must insert another fundamental tenet of liberalism, though it may
well be only a different version of the premise about aggregating individual
choice. Few interesting rights theories eliminate voter sovereignty on all
issues; indeed, I suspect that our shared image of rights theories is that most
issues are to be resolved by asking people what they want, and then enforcing
those choices. But then linking the political process and the judicial one, so that
the boundaries between rights and voting are clearly defined, becomes intensely
problematic. Without such links, or at least without clear boundaries, we
would have two independent bodies authorized to assert that some result is
what our choices, when aggregated, would yield. That situation, however,
poses the threat of tyranny by whichever body has effective power. To reduce
that threat, liberalism requires that institutional linkages, checks and
balances, be created. Once that happens, though, the distinctions between the
political and judicial processes, the only arguments of a comparative institu-
tional sort that rights theories have available, begin to blur. We have recently
been reminded of the historical truth that the Supreme Court in its chambers
does not sound very much different from Congress on the floor.23 Despite
21. See Lupu. Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Anendnent, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979). See
also D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
10 (1978). Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due
Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976).
22. Two exceptions should be noted. Neither Rawls nor Nozick offers theories of aggregating choice when
interests conflict. For Rawls there are no conflicts behind the veil of ignorance; for Nozick unanimity is the only
acceptable decision rule.
23. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
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what some romantics might think,24 that result is the consequence of
structures of government compelled by the premises of liberalism. What
remains is a relatively small issue of the relative costs and benefits of redun-
dancy, in which there are at best some marginal gains for rights theories, none
of them obvious. Finally, the threat of judicial tyranny, which leads liberalism
to create institutions that undermine the case for rights theories, is precisely
the additional assumption that makes internal weaknesses in the political
obstacles theory fatal to it, for willful judges, by exploiting those weaknesses,
can do whatever they want.25
The intellectual historian's puzzle thus has not yet been resolved.
Despite the strength of the prima facie case for the political obstacles
approach, it has been repeatedly rediscovered and then discarded. I suggest
that the explanation is the same as that of the revival of Grand Theory; the
ebb and flow of the political obstacles approach is structurally the same as
that of Grand Theorizing. Both, I believe, are founded in the dilemmas of
liberalism.
We can begin with the easiest points. On one level Grand Theorizing has
been revived for political reasons. Professor Ely explicitly desires to protect
the legacy of the Warren Court,26 and Professor Choper's concern for preserv-
ing the Court's political capital by barring it from the federalism area-pre-
sumably so that it can spend the capital in the area of individual rights-seems
similarly motivated.27 The idea appears to be that the decisions of the Warren
Court can be defended by placing them in some general theoretical frame-
work. There is, however, something slightly odd about that idea. It is far from
clear that the controversial decisions of the Warren Court are adequately
defended by any of the Grand Theories. For example, Professor Ely's theory
defends the reapportionment decisions, which have suffered at most minor
erosion.2 8 Yet it does not, on Professor Ely's presentation, 29 have anything to
say about Miranda or the exclusionary rule.30 Even more, no one has ade-
quately explained how the fact that a decision fits into a Grand Theory implies it
will have greater staying power than one that does not. Again, I emphasize
that my perspective here is that of the intellectual historian. The succession of
Grand Theories makes the point: the fact that a decision is consistent with
fashionable Theory A today does not mean that it will be consistent with
Theory B, which will be fashionable tomorrow, even though Theory A may be
24. See, e.g., Kurland, Book Review, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 185 (1980).
25. Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory,
89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1040-42 (1980).
26. See ELY, supra note 1, at v (dedication). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW v
(1978).
27. See CHOPER, supra note 2, at 164-68, 258-59.
28. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
29. But see Tushnet. Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1046-47 (1980).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 1977 S. Cr. REV. 99.
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"truer" than Theory B. For consumers who share their political predisposi-
tions, the Grand Theorists ought to explain the connection between their
activities and their political intentions. One possibility is that Grand Theory is
the legacy of Wechsler and Bickel, but because the political explanation
claims to rest on an unspecified and, I suggest, implausible connection
between Theory and staying power, not Theory and jurisprudence, it does
not resolve the intellectual historian's puzzle.
A second level of explanation is "economic." Simply put, the idea is that
a generation of younger scholars has found Grand Theory attractive because
it provides a technique for demonstrating that they are sterling professors,
perhaps entitled even to become Sterling Professors someday. But why is
Grand Theory the technique of choice? The surface reason appears to be that
it allows the younger generation to differentiate itself from its predecessor
which played out the implications of Wechsler and Bickel. But nothing in the
economics of academic life requires that sort of product differentiation.
I suppose that we could play around with Oedipal explanations next, but
I prefer to rely, finally, on intellectual elements to account for the phenome-
non of product differentiation. These elements are the contradictory themes
in liberal political philosophy, the attempt to discipline individual will by
reason. All aggregation devices begin with individual will, and it has proven
impossible to treat the outcome of those devices as having a component-
reason-that is by the assumptions of the philosophy absent at the individual
level. The rule of law, in this context the idea of constitutionalism, attempts to
transform the aggregation of individual wills into a supervening rational
power.3' Yet that attempt has always been artificial, and as the artifice in each
form of constitutionalism becomes apparent during the process of clarification
and criticism, another form becomes temporarily more attractive. The cycles
in Grand Theory thus demonstrate its ultimate futility.
Grand Theory must also be seen as rationalism run wild. On the level of
individual psychology, liberalism sees us all as creatures of unbounded desire
who can accept the infliction of harm on everyone else as we pursue our own
ends. This psychology poses an immediate problem for theories of constitu-
tionalism, the problem referred to earlier as that of boundary drawing. Consti-
tutionalism asserts that there are in principle limits on what governors can do.
The move to Grand Theory attempts to escape the arbitrariness of the
governors by providing reasoned grounds for limiting their power. The diffi-
culty, then, is that those to whom Grand Theory is addressed-in the United
States, the judges-are as willful as any other governors. The rationalist move
thus denies what liberal psychology assumes.
I should not be interpreted as denying the truth, in some sense, of one
Grand Theory or another. The problem is institutional and empirical, not
normative. I am willing to assume, though I do so provisionally, that some
3 1. For a number of general discussions, see CONSTITUTIONALISM (Pennock & Chapman, ed., 1979).
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normative Grand Theory is correct. But normative theories are inserted into
real political institutions. The premises of liberal psychology have been vali-
dated by the behavior of that archetypal liberal institution, the United States
Supreme Court. The Court has not worked out, and I suspect will never work
out, a coherent Grand Theory over an extended time. My suspicions are
grounded both in the general argument concerning the contradiction of will
and reason and in the evident institutional arrangements that derive from
liberal assumptions. Most notably, the use of a collegial Court is induced by
fears of judicial willfulness. Yet that particular form of check and balance,
with Justices arriving and departing at irregular intervals, comes as close to
guaranteeing long term incoherence as any institutional arrangement could.
The general problem is most visible in rights theories, which treat constitu-
tional law as an exercise in an atemporal and ahistorical practical ethics. But
the problem affects all Grand Theory.32 The rationalism of Grand Theory
insists on imposing a normative order on a reality that is extremely messy. If
there is any order here, I suspect that it is of a very different sort.
The cycles in Grand Theory are thus based upon the impossibility, within
the universe of liberal psychology and political philosophy, of aggregating
individual wills in institutions subject to the control of reason. Each version of
Grand Theory is incoherent and, more important, each is incoherent in the
same way: under the guise of eliminating arbitrariness through the application
of reason, each introduces its own arbitrariness. There is no reason to think
that any normative theory of constitutional law will resolve that contradic-
tion.
II. TOWARD A POSITIVE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I can imagine someone trying to escape the dilemmas of liberalism by
grasping the horn of will instead of the horn of reason. I have elsewhere
suggested that such a program, which in the end requires the identification of
an arational normative theory, is likely to prove unavailing.3 In the remainder
of this Article I want to sketch a different way out. The strategy is to set aside
the claims of normative theory for a while to develop some outlines of a
rational examination of the phenomenon of constitutional law, and then to
reunite reason and will in what I feel compelled to call Little Theory, an
explicitly political approach to constitutional law.
I have concluded that the way to begin the positive theory of constitu-
tional law34 is to present the analysis of three cases, and only afterwards note
32. For example, the standard law-and-economics approach ignores the historical components of tastes
and resource endowments, even though they are essential to the coherence of the enterprise. See Kelman,
Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 769; Samuels, Normative Premises in Regulatory Theory, I J. POST-
KEYNESIAN ECON. 100 (1978).
33. See Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
34. The term is taken, of course, from economics. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS (1953). In the field of public choice theory, only the most rudimentary beginnings have been made.
For example, Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON.
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the important ways in which they are similar. The first is World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,35 the Court's most recent confrontation with
the constitutional contours of in personam jurisdiction. The complex story
can be simplified, for present purposes, by beginning with Pennoyer v. Neff,36
in which the Court had adopted a stringent test for in personam jurisdiction: it
could be exercised only if the defendant was located within the territorial
boundaries of the state. Pennoyer's territorialism rested on an image of the
standard transaction in the society, an image that may well have been
inaccurate even at the time, and on a sense that political theory required sharp
boundaries around all actors in the political sphere, whether they were indi-
viduals, states, or courts. 37 The transformation of American society after
1880, symbolized by the increased use of automobiles mass-produced on the
assembly line, placed practical and conceptual pressure on Pennoyer. The
standard transaction now had interstate connections, and political theory
came to regard balance and interpenetration of political actors, rather than
boundaries and independence, as the central concepts.38 Fictions about
implied consent and definitions that gave incorporeal entities like corpora-
tions a physical presence39 were eventually abandoned in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington,40 which adopted a two-fold test. First, the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction had to conform to "our traditional conception of fair
play and substantial justice" ;4 second, the defendant had to have "sufficient
contacts or ties with the state of the forum."
42
Thirty years of experience with International Shoe revealed its meaning.
Typically the "contacts" component of the test collapsed into the "fair play"
component, so that the substantiality of the contacts became one of several
ways to measure fairness. One could imagine situations in which the com-
ponents were obviously inconsistent, as when it would be fair to hear a
dispute between residents of Oregon and Massachusetts in Minnesota, even
though the parties had no contacts with the forum state. But, for obvious
reasons of litigation strategy, those cases rarely arose.43 Ambiguous language
875 (1975). argue that constitutions are ways of striking long-term political bargains. Aside from the evident
naivet6 in the assumption that constitutional provisions are self-defining (otherwise the life-span of the bargain
would be shortened by the possibility of judicial interpretation), that seems to describe little more than the
contracts clause in the federal Constitution.
35. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
36. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
37. See D. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought (Oct. 1975) (unpublished manuscript).
See also Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 383
(1979).
38. See Gabel, Intention aiid Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for Critical Legal
Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1977).
39. See Kurland, The Suprenie Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personarn Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 2-5 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958).
40. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
41. Id. at 320.
42. Id.
43. Cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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in International Shoe made it possible to focus primarily on the "fair play"
test, and conceptual reasons were enough to make doing so desirable. Judges
and litigants could readily talk about "fair play"; to apply that test, they
had to argue about the location of evidence, the disruption that would occur
were one party forced to travel, 44 and so on. In contrast, attempts to obtain
reasoned leverage on "sufficient contacts" proved impossible, and decisions
that rested on insufficiency alone necessarily had an air of fiat. In light of
developments in interstate air travel and in the interstate practice of law,
however, if International Shoe meant only "fair play," there would be in
effect no constitutional limitations on a state court's exercise of jurisdiction.
The Woodson case reasserted the existence of such limits. It is too early
to say with confidence why the Court decided the case as it did. On orie view
Woodson is consistent with the moderately "pro-business" coloration of the
present Court,45 since the reassertion of territorial limits is likely in practice to
favor business defendants. Yet it is worth noting that the Court rather clearly
structured its rule to protect the small businessman in the middle while allow-
ing suit against the larger manufacturer.46 The present Court can of course be
characterized as sensitive to the resentiment of the petty bourgeoisie, but
that seems far too transitory a phenomenon to make much of. The case has an
air of ambulance chasing about it, too, that might have affected the Court's
thinking, but that is too much of a "what the judge had for breakfast" analysis
to be much help.
I think more light will be shed on the case by examining the form of the
resulting doctrine. The dissenters proposed to revive Pennoyer's boundary
drawing approach, this time by drawing lines around activities rather than
around territories.47 The majority distorted the supporting argument and then
rejected what it took to be that argument. 4 Instead, it revived Pennoyer in
another way. Pennoyer had been abandoned because its territorialism was
arbitrary in theory and practice. For my purposes, the key passage in
Woodson is:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced
to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for the litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instru-
ment of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to
render a valid judgment. 4
44. See Kailieha v. Hayes, 536 P. 2d 568 (Hawaii 1975). for a case decided in **contacts" terms that is more
easily explicable on the ground that in personam jurisdiction would severely disrupt the individual defendant's
medical practice to force him to travel from Virginia to Hawaii to defend the lawsuit.
45. See, e.g., Mar.shall v. Barlow's, Inc.. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
46. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286, 288 n.3 (1980) (Volkswagen remains as
defendant), id. at 297 (**if the sale ... is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the
manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other states.- jurisdic-
tion is allowed).
47. See id. at 570-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 566-67.
49. Id. at 565-66.
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That is, sometimes the only components of the available test that are amen-
able to reasoned discussion are irrelevant to the constitutional analysis. That,
however, is as close to a definition of arbitrariness as we are likely to get.
The second case I want to discuss is Patterson v. New York,50 which
again can be understood only against its background. In re Winship5 held that
due process required the prosecution in a criminal case to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
[the defendant] is charged."5 2 That formulation scarcely concealed the
problem of defining the legally relevant facts. The difficulty was that Winship
could be rendered meaningless were states allowed freely to define the
"fact[s] necessary to constitute the crime" and conversely the facts that
establish defenses. Yet constitutional control over the definitions meant that
there was some federal constitutional component of the substantive criminal
law. Winship therefore opened the door either to pure formalism or to signifi-
cant federal involvement with what had been traditionally regarded as matters
properly left to the states 3 In Mullaney v. Wilbur,54 the Court stepped
through the second door. There the Maine Supreme Court had held that under
state law there was a single crime of felonious homicide, the "necessary
facts" of which were a killing that was intentional. Facts dealing with whether
the killing was done in the "heat of passion," which in other states would
have reduced the crime from murder to manslaughter, were in Maine said to
be relevant only to sentencing. Thus, the state court concluded that Winship
did not require ajury to find that the killing was premeditated for it to convict
of murder. The Supreme Court disagreed, thereby rejecting a state court's
definition of the elements of a state crime.
The Court treated its holding as a simple ruling on procedural due process
and the burden of proof, apparently unaware of the necessary substantive
basis on which the holding rested. Within two years that basis became clear.
When New York revised its criminal code in 1967, it rejected traditional
common-law distinctions between murder and manslaughter, such as the
"heat of passion" test. Instead, it created a defense to first degree murder,
reducing the crime to manslaughter if the defendant acted "under the influ-
ence of extreme emotional disturbance." Because the defense replaced the
"heat of passion" test and had the same effect as that test had had in Maine,
one might have thought that Mullaney required the state to carry the burden
of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act under
such an influence. Patterson v. New York showed that one would have been
50. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
51. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
52. Id. at 364.
53. See Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation ofSubstantive Criminal Law, 55 B.U. L. REV. 775 (1975). See
also Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur. the Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law, 55 TEX. L. REV. 269
(1977); Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses. Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in tire Criminal La.' 88 YALE L.J.
1321 (1979); Underwood. The Thumb on tire Scales ofiJustice, 86 YALE L. J. 1299 (1977).
54. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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wrong. The Court emphasized the states' interest in defining crimes, and
distinguished Mullaney on the ground that Maine "presumed" premeditation
unless "heat of passion" was established by the defense, while New York
defined the crime of murder as intentional killing. It needs no extended argu-
ment to show, however, that Maine's only constitutional problem, after
Patterson, was to have used the prohibited word "presumption" in attempt-
ing to accomplish exactly what New York did. Once again doctrine has been
developed in an obviously arbitrary form. In Woodson the trick was explicitly
to set aside considerations subject to reasoned analysis; in Patterson it was to
use "distinctions in language that are formalistic rather than substantive," as
Justice Powell put it in his dissent in Patterson.55
My final case is National League of Cities v. Usery,56 the only one
discussed by Professor Choper, who treats it as an aberration.57 There is a
sense in which it is just that, but that sense is more than that the decision is
inconsistent with his Grand Theory. It is also that even taken on its own terms
the decision is arbitrary on its surface. League of Cities held unconstitutional
the extension of the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to state and local governments. The Court provided two kinds of analyses
in support of that result. The first, clearest in the major part of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, argued that congressional exercises of the commerce
power could not "directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. 58 Each of the key
terms is riven with unrationalized distinctions. The Court defined "integral
operations," for example, in a way that would, not suprisingly, treat-every
local legislative decision as an integral operation.59 To limit the sweep of that
definition, one supposes, the Court added the perverse "traditional/innova-
tive" distinction, the outmoded and elsewhere abandoned "direct/indirect"
one, and the unintelligible "commerce power/other powers" one. The effect
is to create a doctrine that is, and has proven to be, good for one day and case
only. The Court's second analysis, clearest in Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion, was a balancing test.60 That test was applied, as all such tests tend to
be, in a completely ad hoc manner: weights were assigned to various congres-
sional powers without discussion, the national interest supporting the legisla-
tion was scarcely mentioned, and the states' interests were assessed on the
basis of disputed factual claims.
The three cases I have briefly discussed share two characteristics, which
I will now suggest are closely related. All three deal in one way or another
with federalism, the definition of the proper sphere of action of the states.
Woodson is concerned with preservation of one state's sphere against intru-
55. 432 U.S. 197, 221 (1977) (Powell, J., aissenting).
56. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
57. CHOPER, supra note 2, at 254, 257.
58. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1976).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 856.
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sion by other states, Patterson with preservation against intrusion by the
courts, and League of Cities with preservation against intrusion by Congress.
Yet all three cases preserve the spheres by developing doctrines that are on
their face arbitrary. The effect, not necesarily intended, is two-fold. Less
important, the obvious arbitrariness allows the Justices to enforce their views
of the political wisdom of the action in question. In this connection, the
American Enterprise Institute rhetoric of League of Cities, and the pro-small
business animus of Woodson, fit into a larger structure. Second, and more
important, arbitrary doctrine allows the Court to state that constitutional
limits on the exercise of judicial or congressional or legislative power exist,
but in a form that provides no definition of those limits. Federalism is
defended by patently arbitrary rules that simultaneously assert the existence of
limits and provide no guarantees that in the next case the Court will defend
federalism at all.
The connection between federalism and arbitrary rules is grounded, I
suggest, in the same antinomy of reason and will we saw in discussing Grand
Theory. For conceptual and political reasons, contemporary liberalism can-
not tolerate the existence of political institutions that mediate between the
individual and the national government.6 ' On the political level, the increasing
demands on the government for infrastructural support of and direct invest-
ment in economic expansion, and for assistance to those left behind-the one
reflecting an economic and the other a legitimation crisis62-require that the
national government be able to move without significant impediment into any
area where crisis threatens stability. Mediating institutions by definition are
such impediments. On the conceptual level, the aggregation of wills in the
national government is supposed to eliminate the Hobbesian war of all against
all, but mediating institutions that are less than all-inclusive would allow a war
of some against some, a situation indistinguishable in practice from the
Hobbesian one.63
Federalism was an attempt to combat this thrust of liberalism by making
individuals members of two independent but linked governments, the state
and the nation. The Framers may have thought that the conflict inherent in
having two aggregation devices could be tolerated, though the early articula-
tion of a strong nationalistic view by John Marshall in cases like McCulloch
and Gibbons suggests that at least some Framers may have thought other-
wise. For a brief period in the late nineteenth century, symbolized in this
discussion by Pennoyer, the Court took seriously the idea of federalism, but
under the pressure of political demands, the delicate conceptual structure,
flawed at its foundation, collapsed. What remained was the possibility that
61. The usual term here is -the State," which would be confusing in the present context.
62. See J. O'CONNOR. THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973). See also J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMA-
TION CRISIS (1975).
63. See Frug. The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980). See also N. POULANTZAS,
STATE. POWER. SOCIALISM 86-92 (1980).
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states could be used, and defended, as mechanisms for the efficient manage-
ment of national policy. The political obstacles theory of Professor Choper
may be seen now as precisely that kind of defense of such intermediate
institutions as states.
This view of liberalism implies that governmental power must be extend-
ible at will, and that is the problem. Constitutionalism is supposed to place
limits on will by the exercise of reason. To adopt this view of liberalism is
therefore to abandon constitutionalism and reason, themselves part of liberal
political philosophy. The solution is the one we have seen: the Court adopts
arbitrary doctrine that says there are limits to governmental power. The arbi-
trary character of the doctrine means that the sword of Damocles will drop,
perhaps at random or perhaps for invidious political reasons, without having
broader implications for the exercise of power generally.
I have argued that the doctrine in these cases is openly arbitrary, and that
hardly seems an effective strategy for enforcing reason against will. That the
problem is generic to constitutional law may be seen, however, in the dissent-
ing opinions in the cases, which do no more than force the arbitrariness
slightly beneath the surface. We can put aside Justice Brennan's dissent in
League of Cities, which takes the position that there are no judicially enforce-
able limits on Congress' power based on federalism.64 The incredibly detailed
argument that Professor Choper makes to support that position indicates
how hard it is to persuade students of constitutional law that some provisions
of the document are not judicially enforceable, or, in the terms of the present
argument, that under some circumstances will ought not be constrained by
reason. The dissents in the other cases assert the existence of limits. Justice
Blackmun in Woodson would distinguish automobiles from other goods
because of their mobility, and would allow jurisdiction wherever an accident
occurred. 66 He claimed that his "position need not now take [him] beyond the
automobile," and that "[c]ases concerning other instrumentalities will be
dealt with as they arise and in their own contexts." 67 Yet that is hardly a
reasoned argument to distinguish cars from all other consumer goods, most of
which are in fact, although perhaps not in form, as mobile as cars. Justice
Brennan would have abandoned limits here too, by making the plaintiff's
choice of forum almost dispositive. s Finally, Justice Powell in Patterson tried
to avoid constitutionalizing the entire substantive criminal law by distinguish-
ing unpersuasively between "new ameliorative affirmative defenses" and
New York's defense of extreme emotional disturbance, even though New
York's defense was in substance broader and more favorable to defendants
than the traditional "heat of passion" defense. 69 He also insisted, as indeed
64. 426 U.S. 833, 856-80 (1976)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. See CHOPER, supra note 2, at 29-45.
66. 444 U.S. 286, 318 (1980)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 586-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. 432 U.S. 197, 216-32 (1977)(Powell, J., dissenting).
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had the majority, that Mullaney was a procedural rule applicable to histori-
cally important factors that states chose to include in their criminal law. But
the historical test is impossible to apply when even modest changes are made;
then the question is whether the new element is "enough" like the old one to
be constitutionally significant. In all three cases, then, both sides either
argued that there were no limits or proposed limits on the exercise of power
that rest, either openly or when analyzed, on the exercise of unreasoned
judgments by the judges, themselves people who exercise power.
The contradiction between will and reason, between the need for govern-
mental power unrestrained by intermediate institutions and the claim implicit
in the constitutional enterprise that governmental power is limited, can be
seen in a slightly different form in the Court's recent flirtation with positivism.
Board of Regents v. Roth70 held that the procedural protections of the due
process clause were available only in cases where property rights were recog-
nized in state lav or the Constitution. This holding threatened to make the
clause meaningless. Problems of distinguishing between liberty and property
interests7 ' quickly led to applying the Roth theory in at least some liberty
cases. 72 If, however, rights were defined by state law,73 it would seem to
follow, as Justice Rehnquist argued in Arnett v. Kennedy,74 that those rights
were no more extensive than the procedures provided in state law for taking
them away.
Taking positivism that far-that is, taking it seriously-was unacceptable
to a majority of the Court. As always, the result was overdetermined. For
example, sometimes the implications of positivism were politically undesir-
able. The best example is First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.75 There the
Court held unconstitutional a state law prohibiting some corporations from
spending money in certain referenda. Justice Rehnquist again took the positi-
vist line, but in dissent: the state law, he said, was merely a definition of some
activities that were ultra vires.76 But the difficulty with positivism went
beyond politics. Taken seriously, positivism would have displayed too starkly
the proposition that governments can do whatever they want. The Court still
gives lip service to the Roth theory77 even as it decides cases by referring to
liberty interests independent of the Constitution or state law.7 8 This approach
70. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
71. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
72. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215. 224 (1976).
73. If rights are defined in some part of the Constitution, that provision standing alone and without any
contribution from the due process clause will generate procedural protections. See Monaghan, First Amendment
"'Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970). See also Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Atendnent. 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975) (same as to equal protection clause).
74. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
75. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
76. Id. at 822-28.
77. See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 100 S. Ct. 2467 (1980).
78. A good example of the schizophrenia is Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), in which the Court found a
state law interest in remaining in a prison instead of being transferred to a mental institution, and an independent
interest in avoiding stigmatization and forced participation in behavior modification programs.
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has an advantage beyond its affirmation of the existence of limits. Once a
protected interest is identified, the Court must specify the procedures that due
process requires. At that stage the Court applies the flexible balancing test of
Mathews v. Eldridge.79 Now the Court has the tools to invoke the Constitu-
tion just as it did in the federalism cases, either whenever it wishes, or as I
have suggested elsewhere, to discipline relatively primitive bureaucracies. 80
More precisely stated, Roth and Eldridge taken together are structurally the
same as the dissents in the federalism cases: the patent arbitrariness of
positivism and the federalism cases is pushed below the surface but persists
nonetheless.
We can now return to Grand Theory, which I have argued is irremediably
infected by arbitrariness in exactly the same form. Each Grand Theory, when
tested against real and imagined cases, reaches a point at which the theorist's
personal-willed-preferences control the outcome. Once we understand
how that happens in the testing cases we can see how it happens in the cases
at the core of the Theory.8' The reasons for the failure of constitutionalism in
the federalism cases are completely general. They derive from the inability of
liberal political theory to tolerate institutions that mediate between the indi-
vidual and the government, an inability rooted in the contradiction between
will and reason that undermines Grand Theory. But constitutional law is a
mediating institution just as federalism is. Indeed, the threat to individuals
posed by willful judges has been the guiding theme in the construction of
Grand Theory. The federalism cases illustrate that the will of the legislature
has not been, and for political and conceptual reasons cannot be, controlled
by the rationalism of constitutionalism. We have precious little reason to
believe that the will of the judges can be controlled by the rationalism of
Grand Theory.
III. A POLITICAL THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
When I reach this point in the argument, or earlier, I am invariably asked,
"Well, yes, but how would you decide the X case?" As will shortly become
crystal clear, there is a sense in which my answer to that question can be of no
interest whatsoever to anyone at all. Yet there is a sense in which the answer
completes the general approach that I suggest is appropriate in constitutional
scholarship.
My answer, in brief, is to make an explicitly political judgment: which
result is, in the circumstances now existing, likely to advance the cause of
socialism? Having decided that, I would write an opinion in some currently
favored version of Grand Theory. For example, I happen to like the political
79. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
80. Tushnet, Truth. Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the
Seventies. 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1979).
81. See Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1056-57 (1980).
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obstacles theory, probably because it has a neat air of scientism and realism
about it. So I would write a political obstacles opinion. That is why my answer
should be uninteresting; I am not in a position to do what my theory suggests,
I make no special claims to political insight, and, most important, the whole
point of the approach is to insist that there are no general answers, but only
tentative ones based on the exact conjuncture of events when the question is
asked. The answer I give today would not necessarily be the one I would give
were I a judge, for that fact itself would signal that political circumstances had
changed drastically.
The political approach obviously opens many areas of potential discus-
sion. I want to mention only two here. First, the approach denies the standard
distinction between the logic of discovery and the logic of justification. 8
Political analysis both leads to the result chosen and provides the grounds on
which the choice can be defended. But the standard distinction mirrors the
distinction between will and reason, so it is not surprising that an approach
that attempts to overcome the latter will be inconsistent with the former.
Second, a jurisprudence of rules emerges from the critique of liberal
political theory. The contradiction of reason and will implies that rules cannot
constrain judges, and thus links my approach to that of Legal Realism.83
Indeed, the critique of liberalism is the only way to make sense of Realism's
claims, which in turn help to explain why there have recently been some
desperate efforts to salvage a traditional jurisprudence of rules from the
wreckage left by Realism:84 something extraordinarily important, liberalism
itself, is at stake. The Realist jurisprudence of rules makes the details of the
opinion supporting a chosen result irrelevant. A broadly written opinion can
be disavowed as so much dictum; a narrowly written one can be said to
provide the principles that guide a court to a result beyond the strict bounds of
the precedent; the flaws in a strongly reasoned opinion, which the critique of
normative theories shows will always exist, can be exploited; and those of a
weakly reasoned one can be papered over.85 In traditional terms, no court can
create a precedent that will inexorably bind its successors; the decision to be
bound must be made by the successors themselves. 6
Now it should be clear why I have called my approach a Little Theory.
The Realist jurisprudence of rules, and the critique of liberalism from which it
derives, mean that in a liberal society there simply cannot be a decision that
has meaning beyond the circumstances in which it arises. Little Theory
embraces that conclusion and asks only that judges not delude themselves
82. R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 25-30 (1961).
83. Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 15 J. SOC. PUB. TEACH. OF LAW 20 (1980).
84. See, e.g., Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article 1ll: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979); Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L.
REV. 1 (1979).
85. 1 leave it to the reader to supply citations. For the first two points my favorites would be Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (treating much of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), as dictum), and Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980) (applying the "'principles- of Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
86. See Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553 (1974).
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into thinking that what they do has significance different from, and broader
than, what every other political actor does. It is not, I think, an unattractive
request. Nor would complying with it be unreasonable. After all, that is what
life is all about.
